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UNIFORM PROBATE CODE-ABOLISHING THE DIS-
TINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
BOYD F. GOLDSWORTHY*
The struggle of the law to modernize is mirrored in the struggle
to abolish the distinction between real and personal property in the
administration of estates. An authority on property law wrote in 1879,
almost one hundred years ago:
The distinction between real and personal property might be
done away, without any disturbance of substantial rights
or interests. There would be a savings of money, of time,
of temper, of trouble; a saving of vexatious lawsuits and of
those worst of quarrels-family quarrels; vast masses of an-
tique and unintelligible law might be forever forgotten; but
beyond this, there would be little change, certainly no change
which the veriest Tory could call revolutionary.'
Since that date we have seen some progress, but it has been
unnecessarily slow. We have to agree with Maitland, who went on
to state:
A few little changes have been made-for accidents will
happen in the best regulated museums-but on the whole,
this interesting specimen of antiquity has been most care-
fully preserved.
2
There is little disagreement that probate administration could
be simplified, hastened and made less expensive if this ancient
doctrine could be everywhere abolished.
HISTORY OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN ESTATE ADMINISTRATION
In early English law, at a time when the basic feature of a
feudal economy was landed estates, land descended in large units
* LL.B., 1989, Harvard University; partner in the law firm of Goldsworthy and
Fifield. Peoria, Illinois.
1. F. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 162, 170 (Westminister Review 1879).
2. Id. at 175.
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by primogeniture to the eldest son, while personalty, considered to
be of far less importance, passed to all the children. When the Amer-
ican states adopted English law, the distinction became ingrained
in our law so that a decendent's personal property passed to his
executor or administrator and real property directly to the heirs
or devisees and could be sold only if the estate were otherwise in-
solvent. Thus, the fact that there is a distinction in administration
between real and personal property is largely historical.3
At common law the surviving spouse was not an heir and no
real estate descended to her. She was entitled to dower, which was
a life estate in one-third of all lands of which her deceased husband
was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the mar-
riage. A widower was entitled to an estate for life by curtesy in all
of the land that his deceased wife owned in fee, provided a child
was born alive to the marriage. Other than this, estates of inheri-
tance descended at death to the eldest son, to the complete exclu-
sion of the other descendants. However, if there was no son or issue
of a deceased son, the daughters took in equal shares.
On the other hand, personal property was administered by the
ecclesiastical courts under law derived from the Roman law.4 Per-
sonal property of a married woman passed to her husband. The
widow took outright one-third of the personal estate of her husband if
the husband was survived by issue, and one-half if not. The children
shared equally in the remainder, with no preference for sons, and
the distribution was per stirpes. The husband took absolute owner-
ship of his deceased wife's personalty, including leaseholds. More
remote distribution was generally to those relatives who stood in the
closest degree of heirship to the decedent according to the rules of
the civil law.,
Legislation in the United States has tended, for the past one
hundred and fifty years, to reduce or eliminate the differences be-
tween the descent of real property and distribution of personal prop-
erty in all states. Primogeniture and the preference for males has
been practically abolished. 6
Until the year 1540 under English law, a tenant in fee simple
could not disinherit his heir; but by the Statute of Wills of that year,
a tenant in fee simple could defeat his heir by will as to two-thirds
of his lands held by military tenure and all land held by socage
tenure. After 1646 this limitation was abolished, and English law
3. & AMERICAM LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.6 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); Fratcher, Toward
Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 1037 (1966) ; Basye, Determination of
Heirship, 54 MiCH. L. R1v. 737 (1956).
4. Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1046
(1966).
5. Statute of Distribution, 22 & 23 Car. 2, c. 10, §§ 5, 6 (1670).
6. Supra note 4. at 1037, 1046-7; but cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-20-27 (1960).
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permitted complete disinheritance of children as to real property
by will. Common law, however, protected widows by the device of
dower, although there was no dower in leasehold estates. Neither
dower nor curtesy could be eliminated by will.
The Statute of Wills of 1540 required wills of real property to be in
writing, but there was no requirement for signing. The Statute of
Frauds in 1676 required a will of land to be signed by the testator
and witnessed by at least three competent witnesses. Personalty
could be passed by an oral will, provided there were three witnesses.
Today, in all American states, the formalities for the execution of
written wills are uniform as to real and personal property.
7
In this country, by tradition, title to personal property of the
decedent passed to his personal representative and thence to his
next of kin or legatees. Title to land, however, belonging to a de-
cedent devolved directly upon the heir or devisee.8
Not until the Land Transfer Act of 18971 did the executor or
administrator in England have any control over realty. Prior to
that time land was not chargeable for the decedent's debts, al-
though the heir himself was liable in some instances. 10 Since pro-
bate courts were organized in America some one hundred years
before this development in England in 1897, we inherited the earlier
English system.
It is obvious that under English law, where land was the bul-
wark of the economy and the feudal system required it to be passed
on to the eldest son, an early distinction between the administra-
tion of real and personal property was natural. However, England
has now completely abolished the distinction between real and per-
sonal property. This took place in 1925 with the passage of the
Administration of Estates Act.1 The reason for the rule having
ceased, England abolished the rule. Nevertheless, in the United
States, although the reason for the distinction has ceased, in a large
number of states the distinction is continued. While no scientific
study has been made, there are indications that real estate makes
up only about twenty percent of the value of estates.
12
In an article entitled The Method, Process and Frequency of
Wealth Transmission at Death,3 Professor Allison Dunham reviews
a study of the transmission of wealth at death made under a grant to
the University of Chicago by the Ford Foundation which involved
7. F~tcher, Toward Uniformn Sucession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1037, 1069
(1966).
8. Basye, Determination of Heirship, 54 MiCH. L. REv. 737, 738 (1956).
9. 60, & 61 Vict.. c. 65 (1897).
10. Supra note 8, at 739.
11. 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 1(1) (1925).
12. 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 745 (1961).
13. Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at Death, 30
U. CHi. L. REv. 241 (1963).
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the analysis of ninety-seven estates for which probate proceedings
were initiated in 1953 in Cook County, Illinois, and seventy-three
estates of decedents who died in 1957. A study was made of the
age of the decedents, the percentage with wills, the percentage
leaving life insurance, the professions and occupations of the de-
cedents and the percentage leaving real estate. The author states:
The table [appearing at page 265] vividly shows the de-
cline of real estate as a significant asset in the decedent's
estate. Fifty per cent had no real estate in the inventory,
and, if the family residence is excluded as an item of in-
vestment, only 33 per cent had investment real estate. Forty-
four per cent of the estates had either publicly or closely
held stocks in the inventory, and about the same number had
bank accounts, including shares of savings and loan associa-
tions. One out of four estates had government bonds in the
portfolio.
14
No effort is made to compare the value of real and personal prop-
erty in the estates.
Fratcher observes in his article1 5 that our probate system is
derived from those in use in England in the seventeenth century
and then states:
In a number of respects the current English systems em-
body statutory and administrative changes, calculated to
adapt them to modern conditions, to a much greater extent
then those currently used by the typical American state.'
6
A better understanding of the English probate system will cer-
tainly aid the efforts of American lawyers to become convinced of
the need for reform and to suggest specific improvements.
In England, executors are deemed to be and are treated as
trustees for many purposes. There, the estate of a person who
dies testate passes at death to his executor, and the estate of one
who dies intestate passes to the President of the Probate, Divorce
and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice pending is-
suance of letters of administration and, upon a grant of such letters,
to the administrator to whom the grant is made. "Estate" for
this purpose includes both real and personal property, whether the
decedent held legal title or an equitable interest.
17
14. Id. at 266.
15. Fratcher, Fiduciary Administration in England, 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 12 (1965).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 41-2; Administrations of Estates Act, 15 Geo.5, c. 23 § 1(1) (1925); WIL-
LIAMS, EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 259 (14th ed. 1960).
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CONTINUING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES TODAY Is AN ANA-
CHRONISM
An expensive, time-consuming procedure is required in many
states to sell real estate in the settlement of the estate, in-
cluding filing a separate complaint, service of process, taking a
default decree, hearing, order of court, report and confirmation of
sale. This is so even though only one vacant lot in the decedent's
estate, worth $1,000.00, is to be sold, while a million dollars in Gen-
eral Motors' stock or a valuable business operated as a sole propri-
etorship could be sold without delay by an ex parte petition to the
probate court. If the husband sold the same lot during his lifetime,
without the wife joining, she would obtain dower in many states;
but the husband could have disposed of the General Motors' stock
or the business without so much as notifying her. Thus the type of
property, real or personal, which the decedent owned at the time
of his death determines, in many states, whether the wife is ade-
quately protected.
Modern estate planning and administration require that real and
personal property be treated alike and with flexibility. The difficulty
of passing title to real estate from a decedent's estate has led to
various unnatural and expensive schemes designed solely for the
purpose of transferring title to real estate and with no other busi-
ness purpose, e. g., the creation of a trust for no other purpose
than holding title to real estate in the decedent's own or another
state, or the organization of a corporation to hold title to all of de-
cedent's real estate.
Many states, including Illinois until 1965,18 require income-pro-
ducing personal property to be sold to pay debts, legacies and costs
of administration before unproductive real estate can be sold, with-
out regard to the needs of the family. This rule still prevails in a
substantial number of states. In such states, personal property
specifically bequeathed must be exhausted before resort can be had
to the real estate specifically devised. States which treat the two
types of property alike have generally specified in their statutes
that real or personal property shall abate ratably in discharging
indebtedness or in satisfying monetary legacies. 19
The existence of common law dower is assuredly an obstacle
to free commerce in land and a threat to the merchantability of
titles. If a man owning land desires to sell and his wife is hostile, men-
tally incompetent or missing, he is unable to convey an acceptable
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 225 (1963).
19. See 1 .P-H WILLS & TRUSTS ESTATE PLANNING SERV. T 2701, for reference to the
applicable statutes in each state.
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title or mortgage the property. A title examiner cannot know that
a woman who signs as a man's wife today is his actual wife or
whether there is another woman from whom he has never been di-
vorced. At the same time, dower does not provide adequate pro-
tection for women in an economy which classifies most wealth as
personal property. 20 A husband's wealth may consist of valuable
long-term leaseholds or other forms of personal property to which
dower does not attach; and, consequently, his wife has no protec-
tion.
Legislation enacted from the late 1700's to the 1960's has in-
creasingly given the widow a share in personal property,2 1 which she
may elect to take in lieu of the provisions made for her by the
husband's will; but the same liberty does not generally apply to
real estate.
All common law states, except the Dakotas, apparently impose
some restriction on the power of a spouse to disinherit the other.
22
A MAJORITY OF THE STATES HAVE MOVED TOWARD ABOLISHING
THE DISTINCTION
Some twenty-six states have completely, or substantially, abol-
ished the distinction between real and personal property in admin-
istration.23 Some of these, however, still maintain vestiges of the
old distinction 24. In 1965, Illinois took a major stride in the direction
of the abolition of the distinction, but a number of remnants still
remain.2 5 For instance, while not required for personal property,
a formal proceeding to sell real estate is retained, necessitating
the filing of a petition to sell, service of process on all interested
parties as in other civil cases, mandatory appointment of a guardian
ad litem for minors and incompetents, the filing of a special bond,
hearing, order of court authorizing deed, report of sale and order
confirming sale. This is a proceeding which would normally require
at least sixty days, assuming there are no objections. If the where-
abouts of interested parties is unknown, publication is required..
2
6
This is needlessly cumbersome and time consuming when the exec-
20. See McDoNALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960).
21. F rtchor, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037, 1054
(1966).
22. See UNIFORM PROBATE CODE art. IT, pt. 2 (Comment) ; 1 P-H WILLS & TRUSTS ES-
TATE PLANNING SERV. 2701; Plager, The Spouse's Nonbarrable Share: A Solution in
Search of a Problem, 33 U. CH. L. REV. 681 (1966).
23L See generatl Scoles, Improving Administration of Estates-The Abolition of the
Distinction Bdtween Real and Personal Property, 52 ILL. B. J. 594 (1964) ; Basye, Aboli-
tion of the Distinction Between Real and Personal Property in the Administration of De-
cedenrs' Estates, 51 ILL. B. J. 214 (1962) ; and 1 P-H WILLS & TRUSTS ESTATE PLANNING
Snv. 2701, where reference to:most of the statutes in the United States and annota-
tionms to them can be found.
24. Supra note 23.
25. ILL. ANN. STAT. eh. 3, §§ 225-242 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
26. Id.
ABOLISHING THE DISTINCTION
utor or administrator could be entrusted by statute to sell and convey
real estate with as little difficulty as the sale of the equivalent
in value of personal property.
In North Dakota, in order to complete a contract for sale of
real estate made by the decedent, the personal representative must
file a petition, and ". . . all persons interested in the estate must
be cited as in other proceedings. ' 2 7 If the court is satisfied, after
hearing, that the petition should be granted, a decree is entered.
After the conveyance is made, the personal representative must
make a report to the county court. Thus a distinction is made, as
there is no such requirement before the personal representative can
carry out the decedent's contract to sell personalty.
All personal property of the estate may be sold by the personal
representative without notice and without securing an order of court.28
On the other hand, to obtain an order for the sale of real property,
an executor or administrator must present a verified detailed peti-
tion. 29 If it appears to the court from the petition that it is necessary
or to the advantage of the estate and those interested in it, the
petition must be filed, a hearing date set and a citation issued and
served. 0 The Act specifies what must be contained in the order of
sale.2 1 No private sale can be made without a published notice of sale
and an opportunity given for written bids.32 Nor can a private sale
be made for less than ninety percent of the appraised value based
on an appraisal made within one year. A report of sale to the
court is required and so is an order confirming sale before the sale
is final.2 2 These are typical provisions and establish far more strin-
gent requirements for the sale of real estate than for the sale of
personal property, regardless of respective values. In the case of
In re Foster's Estate, the Supreme Court of North Dakota in 1958
construed this statute and wrote:
A proceeding to sell real estate while within the framework
of the administration of the estate is separate and distinct
from general administration. It is available when necessary
to the proper administration of the estate, where it is for
the best interests of the estate or is assented to by all per-
sons interested. Section 30-1909 NDRC 1943. The proceeding
is wholly statutory and it is the duty of both the court and
the administrator to render substantial compliance with the
applicable statutory provisions.
2 4
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30-13-12 (1960).
28. Id. § 30-19-01 (1960).
29. Id. § 30-19-05 (1960).
30. Id. § 30-19-06 (1960).
31. Id. § 30-19-10 (1960).
32. Id. § 30-19-14 (1960').
33. Id. § 30-19-18 (1960').
34. 89 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1958).
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The facts of the case reveal a sale of real estate which was in-
validated because of failure to follow the rigid statutory require-
ments. No such requirements would have applied to a sale of a
business, of corporate stock or chattels worth ten times the value
of the land.
In 1965, Illinois amended the Probate Act3 5 to abolish some of
the distinctions by placing possession and control of real as well as
personal property for purposes of administration in the personal
representative. Title, however, passes to the heir or devisee. This
legislation followed generally the provisions of the Model Probate
Code of 1946. Priority of real over personal property was eliminated,
so that all property is equally chargeable with legacies, costs of
administration and claims in determining which property shall be
sold. The personal representative was given authority to pay taxes,
insure the property and keep it in repair. He can institute a pro-
ceeding to determine title, but only with court permission. However,
the Act did not go far enough in simplifying administration, since
in order for real estate to be sold by the personal representative
(except, of course, pursuant to the power of sale in the will), a
cumbersome and time-consuming proceeding must be conducted as
referred to above.
In addition, other vestiges of the distinction remain, but they
are being gradually removed. It was only by an act effective De-
cember 31, 1967, that Illinois provided that a mortgage on real
estate need not be paid off with personal assets in the estate.3 6 On
August 28, 1969, the governor signed into law an amendment simpli-
fying the procedure for completing a decendent's contract to convey
real estate, making it virtually the same as that for personalty.3 7
These are examples of piecemeal legislation slowly removing the
sanctity of real estate over personal property.
The North Dakota statutes, in connection with the partition of
the real property in the estate, provide that if the court approves a
report of the commissioners that they cannot divide the real estate
without prejudice or inconvenience, they may assign the whole to one
party who will accept it, ". . . always preferring the male to female,
and, among children, preferring the elder to the younger"38 (an
echo of primogeniture). The party accepting the whole must pay
to the other parties interested their just proportion of the true value
to their satisfaction.3 9
The trend in the United States is definitely toward giving the
35. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, §§ 225-242 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970).
36. Id. § 219.
37. Id. § 252.
38. N.D. CENT. CODE & 30-2!-27 (1960).
39. Id.
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executor or administrator not only possession of real estate but also
a right and, in fact, a duty to collect the rents and profits, to pay
taxes on the property, to keep it insured and in tenantable repair,
and to account to the ultimate distributees for the receipts and dis-
bursements.
The Model Probate Code completed in 1946 was the basis for
the Uniform Probate Code. In the interim, many states have adopt-
ed portions of the Model Probate Code which should make it more ac-
ceptable and easier for the Uniform Probate Code to achieve gen-
eral acceptance. Maryland, in 1969, enacted a new Probate Code
40
which follows the pattern of the Uniform Probate Code, with some
modifications. It seems inevitable that other states will follow.
BENEFITS FROM ABOLISHING THE DISTINCTION
There are some very definite improvements which can be made
when the distinction between real and personal property in estate
administration is abolished. In general, the result is a speedier,
more efficient and more economical settlement of estates.
1. When personal property must be consumed before real prop-
erty can be used to pay debts, income-producing personal property
may have to be sold before unproductive real estate in order to
pay debts or legacies, without regard to the needs of the decedent's
family. Thus, the stock of a closely held family business corporation
technically may have to be sold before an unimproved lot. Income
from real property is not available to pay debts in many states,
whereas personalty is available. Priority as to which asset will be
sold to pay debts may depend upon whether land is held directly
by the decedent or through a wholly-owned corporation, a land
trust or under a Uniform Partnership Act partnership. Where land
and personalty are treated alike, debtors can be paid, while at the
same time the maximum value of the assets may be salvaged for
the family and the distributees.
2. There are serious administrattive problems where the dis-
tinction is being retained. If the personal representative cannot take
possession of realty, there is always confusion with regard to assets
which include both real and personal property, such as furnished
apartments, stores with fixtures or farms and shops with equipment.
However, where the distinction is abolished, income from land, as
well as stocks, bonds, land trusts or land equitably converted by
contract for deed or direction to sell are treated the same for pur-
poses of administration.
40. MD. ANN. CoDs art. 93, § 1 et aeq. (1969).
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3. In many states, when the distinction is maintained, there
is no reliable muniment of title to realty owned by the decedent and
passing upon his death. On the other hand, where the administra-
tion is concluded by an order of distribution which covers the realty,
such an order can be the equivalent of a judicial determination of
title which will avoid reliance upon affidavits of heirship to prove
title.
41
4. Where a separate proceeding must be conducted, and vari-
ous parties are served with process and a hearing is held, slight
defects in these proceedings affect the merchantability of title, as
any title examiner will verify. This is not so likely where the per-
sonal representative can take control of real as well as personal
property from the beginning. The heirs and devisees are notified
of the opening of the probate in the beginning and need not be
made parties defendant if a sale of the real estate is necessary
or at the time of distribution. 42 After the estate is opened, the
proceeding is "in rem". In many states, unless the estate is insolv-
ent, there is no power to sell realty in court proceedings; and in
order to clear title, it may be necessary to obtain deeds from heirs
who are widely separated geographically.
4
5. When the distinction is abolished in administration, the
adoption of uniform laws of inheritance applying alike to both real
and personal property frequently follow.
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE'S TREATMENT OF REAL AND PER-
SONAL PROPERTY ADMINISTRATION
The Uniform Probate Code'4 4 follows the Model Probate Act
of 194645 by completely eliminating the distinction between real and
personal property in estate administration. Property is defined as
including both real and personal property.4 6 It is. a ". . . basic
premise of the Code that distinctions between real and personal
property should be abolished.
'47
The Uniform Probate Code provides that, unless the will other-
wise directs, every personal representative shall take possession or
control of the decedent's property (real and personal), except that
41. See Basye, Determination of Heirship, 54 MICH. L. REv. 737 (1956).
42. Id. at 772.
43. Sooles, Improving Administration of Estates-The Abolition of the Distinction Be-
tween Real and Personal Property, 52 ILL. B. 3. 594 (1964).
44. The Uniform Probate Code was promulgated by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the House of Delegates of the Ameri-
can Bar Association in August 1969.
45. See generally Niles, Model Probate Code and Monographs on Probate Law: A Re-
view, 45 MICH. L. Itv. 321 (1947).
46. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE § 1-201(hh).
47. Id. § 2-112 (Comment).
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any real property or tangible personal property may be left with or
surrendered to the person presumptively entitled thereto. This is so
unless or until the personal representative believes possession of the
property by him will be necessary for administration. Thereupon,
he may request possession, and it shall be given to him.4 8 Title to
real and personal property passes immediately upon death to the
heirs or, if there is a will, to the devisees.4 9 However, the per-
sonal representative has "power over title" from the time of his
appointment until his discharge.5 0 "Power over title" is a new con-
cept introduced by the Code. It is designed to ease the succession of
assets which are not possessed by the personal representative, ac-
cording to the official comments. 51 Thus, if the power is unexercised
prior to the discharge of the personal representative, its lapse
clears the title of devisees and heirs. The personal representative is
given the same "power over title" as an absolute owner would
have. This is intended to embrace all possible transactions which
might require a conveyance or encumbrance of assets or a change
of right to possession.
52
The relationship of the personal representative is that of trustee,
which imposes a well-defined and strict set of duties and responsibili-
ties. Thus, if the personal representative exercises the power im-
properly, he is liable for a breach of his fiduciary duty to interested
persons for damages to the same extent as the trustee of an ex-
press trust. 5 Sales by the personal representative to bona fide
purchasers, without notice, are valid, although the personal repre-
sentative acts beyond his authority.
54
The Uniform Probate Code is designed to make the deed of con-
veyance or instrument of distribution upon closing of the estate the
usual muniment of title.55 This is fortified by a provision that
"[p]roof that a distributee has received an instrument or deed of
distribution of assets in kind, or payment in distribution, from a
personal representative, is conclusive evidence that the distributee
has succeeded to the interest of the estate in the distributed assets,
as against all persons interested in the estate. .... -56
Also, the Uniform Probate Code is quite clear that, in the dis-
tribution of assets, whenever abatement is necessary, it shall be
without any preference or priority as between real and personal
48. Id. § 3-709.
49. Id. § 3-101.
60. Id. § 3-711.
51. Id. § 3-711 (Comment).
52. Id. § 3-711.
53. Id. § 3-712.
54. Id. § 3-714.
55. Id. § 3-711 (Comment).
56. Id. § 3-908.
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property. . . ."57 In addition, the personal representative is given
full powers to deal with the estate, including executing deeds of con-
veyance upon the receipt of all sums remaining due on a contract
for deed, repairing and altering buildings, subdividing land, adjust-
ing boundaries, selling, mortgaging and leasing real property.58
Taking a typical case under the Uniform Probate Code, if the
decedent left stocks, accounts in banks, and real estate, the per-
sonal representative could immediately take possession of all. He
could sell the stocks and real estate, converting it to cash, and
distribute the cash; or he could permit possession of real estate to
pass to and remain in the devisee under the will or the heirs if there
was no will. If a sale of the real estate was desirable, it could be
sold by a deed of the personal representative with no more for-
mality than the sale of corporate stock. This would obviously ex-
pedite administration, would make it less expensive and, at the
same time, would improve the merchantability of title, since
there would be less opportunity for defects to creep into proceed-
ings to sell real estate. This assumes, of course, a formal testacy
proceeding in which all interested parties would have received notice
at the time of the opening of probate.
SOME HIGHLIGHTS AND ADVANTAGES OF THE UNIFORM PRO-
BATE CODE
While it is not the objective of this article to discuss generally
the provisions of the Uniform Probate Code, other than as they
apply to the administration of real and personal property, it is
noteworthy here that the Code has many modem provisions which
will permit more effective and efficient estate planning. A uniform
law on probate will meet the needs of the constant dispersion of
American property holders, their beneficiaries and their assets,
since estate problems are becoming increasingly national in scope.
The updating and modernization of probate law and practice in
the United States has its best chance for success through the Uni-
form Probate Code, which many believe is as much needed as was
the Uniform Commercial Code. Adoption of the Uniform Probate
Code will answer much of the challenge of recent attacks upon
probate law and practice. The adoption of the Uniform Probate
Code would reduce action by the probate court in routine matters to
a minimum. Two optional types of administration are possible under
the Code, one being referred to as "independent administration"
or "informal administration". This procedure may be used when
there is an interest in staying out of court. "Supervised administra-
67. Id. § 8-902(a).
58. Id. § 3-715.
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tion", on the other hand, is administration under the continuing
authority of the court as now exists in most states. This flexible
system of administration available under the Code would permit an
interested person to start with letters and then, if it were later
discovered that the assets and the risks were small, to distribute
the estate quickly without further formality.59
Independent administration with full opportunity for any inter-
ested party to have recourse to the probate court when it is needed
is an accurate description of the way administration is handled in
practice in many states." The personal representative has a
fiduciary relationship which may produce several occasions for re-
course to courts for resolution of particular problems, but in routine
estates no such recourse may be necessary. It seems to the author,
as a practicing lawyer, that the Code would give us what most
careful and conscientious lawyers would want-that is, freedom from
having to go to court for unneeded orders or with unrequested re-
ports, and when necessary, a forum and a basic statute available
for the resolution of controversies and issues. It would permit steer-
ing a course which would allow service to clients that is more
responsive to the demands of the occasion. The Code will serve
both the Bar and the public well if the process of leaving property
by will can be simplified to the point where it is no more compli-
cated than the process of setting up inter vivos trusts for the pur-
pose of controlling property after death. If this can be accomplished,
clients will again rely upon lawyers for much of the estate planning
work which has moved to alternatives in the last several years.
LAWYERS' INTEREST IN PROBATE SIMPLIFICATION AND REFORM
We must recognize that the public is becoming increasingly more
conscious of the cumbersome procedures necessary in many states
to probate an estate. There are archaic complexities which can be
eliminated. 61 Lawyers can well admit that probate, as it exists in
many states today, should best be avoided, if feasible. By skillful
planning and the use of well-known devices, an attorney can guide
a client toward avoiding probate. These include the joint and surviv-
orship registration of savings and checking accounts, real estate,
09. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44
IND. L. J. 191 (1968-69).
60. Id. at 199.
61. That there is public interest In the subject of avoiding probate Is evident from the
fact that N. DACEY, How To AvoID PROBATE (1965), ran first in the non-fiction best seller
list in the late months of 1966. The publication consists of about 50 pages of text and
291 pages of duplicated forms. Nevertheless, sales have exceeded 670,000 copies. Dacey, a
non-lawyer, dharges specifically and quite seriously that probate law and procedure are
archaic and needlessly complex; that succession through probate is terribly time-consum-
ing and dostly. He advises his readers to not trust the law of succession but to work
around probate by the use of self-declared trusts of various assets and joint tenancy
designations.
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bonds, stocks, and promissory notes. By the use of inter vivos re-
vocable and irrevocable trusts, land trusts, the chartering of a cor-
poration solely to hold title to real estate, and through the use of
the small estates act of his state for the remnants an attorney can
also help his client to avoid probate. Such planning and execution
takes time and money and means the client must sacrifice some
measures of control and freedom of action. Should he do it? This
depends on how abominable is probate! What does it cost? How
long does it take? The answers to these questions rest upon the
applicable probate law and the state or states in which the client
owns property. If probate laws were uniform, streamlined and con-
tained the necessary options so that these questions could be an-
swered to the client's satisfaction, he could forget about undesirable
changes in his plan of holding title to his property, unless, of course,
tax planning is controlling.
A new approach eliminating many steps in routine estate settle-
ment is needed.6 2 The ideal system would be one in which, im-
mediately and automatically upon death, ownership of the dece-
dent's property, real and personal, would belong to his heirs or de-
visees, with all creditors paid and with no residual title prob-
lems. This cannot happen automatically and immediately, but there
should be a better system than that which has spawned such de-
vices as the above in order to "avoid probate", the current vogue.
People are not asking the right questions and are, therefore, not
getting the right answers. The questions are, "Is probate the best
system? If so, how can it be made speedier and more economical?"
There would be no reason why clients would want to "avoid pro-
bate" if the disadvantages of this traditional system could be re-
moved. Yet, the system, including the use of the will as the corner-
stone of the plan, is changing. If the present trend away from wills
as a method of passing large amounts of wealth from one genera-
tion to the next continues, the will may become as much a museum
piece as "foeffment to uses".
Unfortunately, it can scarcely be refuted that the Uniform Pro-
bate Code, as presently drafted, is an extremely complex, lengthy
form of proposed legislation requiring intensive study in order to
comprehend its terms and its application. The Code covers some
one hundred and twenty pages of fine print, introduces several new
doctrines and concepts such as the "power over title" concept,
changes the laws of descent, abolishes dower and curtesy and intro-
duces the "augmented estate" to protect the surviving spouse.
Many of these new concepts will be controversial. However, when
62. Wellman, The Lawyer's Stake in Probate Reforms, 47' MICH. ST. B. J. 10 (Mar.
1968).
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the proposed statute is understood, it is apparent that it will stream-
line and make administration much simpler and presumably less
expensive. Simplicity of operation, it is believed, would be in ad-
verse ratio tO the complexity of the document itself. If a much
simpler, shorter, less complex statute could have been drafted with
the prospect of equivalent results, all who work in the probate area
would have applauded. The problem with the Code will be in in-
ducing enough lawyers and legislators to study, analyze and under-
stand it in order to have it adopted by the fifty legislatures as the
Uniform Probate Code applicable generally in the United States, as
the Uniform Commercial Code has been almost (now 49 states)
universally adopted.
The basic scheme of the Uniform Probate Code is to provide the
various major features of the different probate systems presently
followed in the fifty states as options in a single system. The exigen-
cies of the particular estate and the personalities involved will de-
termine which features the lawyer for the estate will elect to use.
Specialists in probate law, in order to serve clients best either in
planning or administering their estates, must be able to render
services that cross state lines. To accomplish this, uniformity is
essential. If this is difficult because of local desires to minimize
change from present procedures, it is understandable, but it is hoped
that legislatures will resist the temptation and stay within the Uni-
form Probate Code, as drafted, in the interest of true uniformity.
This is necessary so that a lawyer can give reliable estate planning
advice to a client who may live elsewhere when he dies.
The answer to probate reform will undoubtedly be in the num-
ber of dedicated lawyers who are willing to give the time, study
and attention to promoting the adoption of the Uniform Probate
Code, from the local bar association to the various state bar as-
sociations, culminating in recommendations to the legislatures of
the fifty states.6
The realities of practice today, coupled with extensive and con-
tinuing legal education, have made the Bar more receptive to in-
novation in this field. It is believed that the Code will be accepted
by city-oriented lawyers as well as by lawyers in rural communities.
There is no doubt that a selling job remains to be done, for the
lawyers and legislatures of the fifty states must be convinced of
the need for a Uniform Probate Code and the desirability of this
particular Code. In the meantime, and regardless, it is hoped that
63. Lawyers can take credit for the progress being, made toward the Uniform Probate
Code since it originated through a sub-committee of the Americin Bar Association, fi-
nanced almost entirely by lawyers' dues and gifts channelled through the American Bar
Foundation. The project has been active since late 1962. The Uniform Probate Code, When
widely adopted, will refute Dacey's dharge that lawyers cannot work for and achieve pro-
bate reform.
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the trend toward abolishing the distinction between real and per-
sonal property for estate administration purposes will continue. This,
in itself, is progress and improvement. Holmes says it best in his
The Path of the Law: 64
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is
still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply per-
sists from blind imitation of the past.6 5
CONCLUSION
If this article leads to the conclusion that reform of private law
is a slow and laborious process, it is true. One hundred years
seems to be a short period in probate reform. Nevertheless, the
existence of the Uniform Probate Code should speed up the process.
If the Code does no more than stimulate interest in at least mod-
ernizing some aspects of probate, such as abolishing the distinc-
tion in administration between real and personal property, it will
be an impressive forward step.
64. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Rzv. 457 (1897).
65. Id. at 469.
